A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
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Publication:1183700
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90073-QzbMath0764.90013MaRDI QIDQ1183700
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
game of perfect information; generalized Nash bargaining solution; unique perfect equilibrium outcome
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