Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90018-NzbMATH Open0764.90102OpenAlexW2048189671MaRDI QIDQ1189702FDOQ1189702

Authors: Hans Peters 

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90018-n

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• Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencybargainingNash equilibriumself-optimalityutility distortion game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Selfishness level of strategic games
• Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
• Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games

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