Validated equilibrium and sequential spatial competition games

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(92)90005-PMaRDI QIDQ1197632zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Spagat

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(92)90005-p

zbMATH Keywords

subgame-perfect equilibriumcheap talksequential spatial competition gamevalidated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition
• Sequential Equilibria
• Secure strategy equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition
• Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection in observable queues
• Sequential equilibria in signaling games

Cites work

• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Communication between rational agents
• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Contract enforcement in sellers' markets
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• The role of indifference in sequential models of spatial competition: an example

Cited in

(1)

• Sequential location when transportation costs are asymmetric

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