The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-Savage argument for Bayesian theory

DOI10.1007/BF00485690MaRDI QIDQ1244008zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Allan Birnbau

Publication date 1977

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485690

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) General considerations in statistical decision theory (62C05) Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Asymptotic properties of parametric tests (62F05)

Cites work

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Cited in

(7)

• Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics!
• The distinction between inference and decision
• The foundations of statistics - are there any?
• Decisions as statistical evidence and Birnbaum's confidence concept
• Reconciling frequentist properties with the likelihood principle
• Rejoinder: ``On the Birnbaum argument for the strong likelihood principle
• Confidence distributions and empirical Bayes posterior distributions unified as distributions of evidential support

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