Well-posedness of linear closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for singularly perturbed systems

DOI10.1016/0016-0032(79)90089-9zbMath0408.90096WikidataQ127391117 ScholiaQ127391117MaRDI QIDQ1258692

K. Appert

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of the Franklin Institute (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-0032(79)90089-9

zbMATH Keywords

Decision Making; Application of Mathematical Programming; Leader-Follower Game; Linear Closed-Loop Strategy; Singularly Perturbed Systems; Stackelberg Games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

90C90: Applications of mathematical programming

91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)

93C05: Linear systems in control theory

91A35: Decision theory for games

Related Items

Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for singularly perturbed systems: the recursive approach, Singular perturbations and time-scale methods in control theory: Survey 1976-1983, Robust Nash strategies for a class of non-linear singularly perturbed problems†, Team-optimal closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for systems with slow and fast modest

Cites Work

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