EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: A laboratory evaluation

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1996.0010MaRDI QIDQ1267692zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Timothy N. Cason, Charles R. Plott

Publication date 8 December 1998

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171107-164126678

zbMATH Keywords

call auction institutionenvironmental protection agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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(9)

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• Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation
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