Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2443MaRDI QIDQ1276118zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Srihari Govindan, Arthur Robson

Publication date 4 October 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2443

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Recommendations

• Forward induction and public randomization
• On Forward Induction
• Forward induction equilibrium
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Strong forward induction

Cites work

• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Forward induction and public randomization
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4213773 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Stable equilibria and forward induction

Cited in

(3)

• Forward induction and public randomization
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
• Forward induction equilibrium

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