When can carbon abatement policies increase welfare? The fundamental role of distorted factor markets

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1998.1058MaRDI QIDQ1289205zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ian W. H. Parry, Roberton C. III Williams, Lawrence H. Goulder

Publication date 5 August 1999

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10514/files/dp970018.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

environmental economicsrevenue-neutral carbon tax

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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