``Costless regulation of monopolies with large entry cost: A game theoretic approach

DOI10.1007/S001820050097MaRDI QIDQ1293480zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Moshe Bar Niv, Israel Zang

Publication date 4 March 2001

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050097

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaantitrust regulationmonopolies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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• Implementing efficient market structure. Optimal licensing in natural oligopoly when tax revenue matters

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