``Costless regulation of monopolies with large entry cost: A game theoretic approach

DOI10.1007/S001820050097zbMATH Open0955.91008OpenAlexW2049035996MaRDI QIDQ1293480FDOQ1293480

Israel Zang, Moshe Bar Niv

Publication date: 4 March 2001

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050097

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaantitrust regulationmonopolies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cited In (6)

• Regulations, regime switches and non-monotonicity when non-compliance is an option: an application to content protection and preference.
• DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY
• Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly
• Solution for a class of closed-loop leader-follower games with convexity conditions on the payoffs
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Implementing efficient market structure. Optimal licensing in natural oligopoly when tax revenue matters

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