Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms

DOI10.1007/S001990050274MaRDI QIDQ1293745zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo G. Garella, Yves Richelle

Publication date 29 June 1999

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://amsacta.unibo.it/5112/1/214.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationexitsunk costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(7)

• Sunk costs, entry and clustering
• Why do firms dump at a loss? An economies-of-scale explanation
• Live or let die? alternative routes to industry exit
• The Devolution of Declining Industries
• The effects of sunk costs on entry and exit: Evidence from 36 countries
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• A note on the relation between size, ownership status and plant's closure: sunk costs vs. strategic size liability

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