Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems
The authors investigate choice functions and choice correspondences where the collective choice problem is not necessarily convex. Let \(\Omega^n\) denote the class of compact, comprehensive subsets of \(R^n_+\) with non-empty interior. Then \(S \in \Omega^n\) may not be convex. The authors' first result is that there are no UpperHemiContinuous (UHC) choice functions (i.e., single-valued choice correspondences) on \(\Omega^n\) satisfying Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO). However, lifting the single-valuedness restriction, the authors obtain the following sharp characterization of choice correspondences: A UHC choice correspondence on \(\Omega^n\) satisfies SPO, Arrow's Choice Axiom, and a compromization condition if and only if it is regularly representable (Theorem 2). As an application, the authors characterize Choquet bargaining solutions.
- Non-binary choice functions on non-compact sets
- Inequality averse collective choice
- Extending Nash's axioms to nonconvex problems
- Collective choice functions on non-convex problems
- The Choquet bargaining solutions
- Rational choice with status quo bias
- Large-scale group decision-making with non-cooperative behaviors and heterogeneous preferences: an application in financial inclusion
- Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887385 (Why is no real title available?)
- Non-existence of continuous choice functions
- The hard problem and the tyranny of the losers
- Social choice rules when individuals are responsible for their skills
- Inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions
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