The authors study the fictitious play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing the coordinate yields of payoff of zero for both players. They show that every fictitious play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type; players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinate (almost surely) against their own as well as against players with bounded recall.
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