On some properties of the -core of games with coalition structure

DOI10.1007/S001820050017zbMATH Open1111.91304OpenAlexW2063751700MaRDI QIDQ1295846FDOQ1295846

Authors: Akira Nakayama, Takeshi Naitoh 

Publication date: 28 June 1999

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050017

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zbMATH Keywords

kerneldecomposability\(\varepsilon\)-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (6)

• Correction to: ``Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
• On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Core of Coalition Games on MV-algebras
• NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
• On dominance core and stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games

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