On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00021-8zbMATH Open0926.91007MaRDI QIDQ1296486FDOQ1296486

Authors: Giacomo Bonanno, Klaus Nehring 

Publication date: 29 November 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumgame-theoretic solution conceptsnegative introspection of common belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Agreeing to disagree
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• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic
• On the evaluation of solution concepts
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• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
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• Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
• Formal semantics for mutual belief
• On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results
• Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic
• On the logic of common belief and common knowledge
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Logic of Common Belief

Cited In (3)

• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
• Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information

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