Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
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Publication:1308825
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1026zbMath0801.90026MaRDI QIDQ1308825
Richard O. Beil, Raymond C. Battalio, John B. Van Huyck
Publication date: 6 January 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1026
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
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