The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
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Publication:1331066
DOI10.1007/BF00193810zbMath0822.90006MaRDI QIDQ1331066
Dominique Lepelley, Boniface Mbih
Publication date: 18 August 1994
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B14: Social choice
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