Farsighted coalitional stability
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Publication:1332710
DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1044zbMath0841.90131MaRDI QIDQ1332710
Publication date: 29 July 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1044
solution concept; coalitional stability; coalitional form games; largest consistent set; majority rule voting; weak nonemptiness conditions
91A12: Cooperative games
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