Harsanyi's aggregation theorem: Multi-profile version and unsettled questions
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Publication:1338545
DOI10.1007/BF00183302zbMATH Open0812.90006OpenAlexW1965230962MaRDI QIDQ1338545FDOQ1338545
Authors: Philippe Mongin
Publication date: 1 December 1994
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183302
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- Philippe Mongin 1950--2020
- Harsanyi's theorem without the sure-thing principle: on the consistent aggregation of monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences
- Epictetusian rationality
- Two variants of Harsanyi's aggregation theorem
- Anonymous single-profile welfarism
- Philippe Mongin (1950-2020)
- Harsanyi's aggregation theorem without selfish preferences
- Risky social choice with incomplete or noisy interpersonal comparisons of well-being
- Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem for state-contingent alternatives
- Impartiality and relative utilitarianism
- Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism
- Extensive measurement in social choice
- Welfarism on economic domains
- Variable-population extensions of social aggregation theorems
- Utilitarianism with and without expected utility
- To be or not to be involved: a questionnaire-experimental view on Harsanyi's utilitarian ethics
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