Anonymity and optimality of competitive equilibria when markets are incomplete

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1057MaRDI QIDQ1339742zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Atsushi Kajii

Publication date 8 December 1994

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1057

zbMATH Keywords

anonymous constrained optimalcompetitive equilibriaefficiencymarkets are incompleteoptimalitytwo period economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(12)

• Optimal futures innovation in a dynamic economy: The discrete-time case
• Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining
• Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?
• Core concepts for incomplete market economies
• The taxation of trades in assets
• Inefficiency of equilibria with incomplete markets
• Endowment redistribution and Pareto improvements in GEI economies
• Transaction costs and planner intervention
• Decisions and Optimality in Competitive Stock Ownership Economies
• Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
• Observability and optimality
• Constrained suboptimality when prices are non-competitive

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