Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1058MaRDI QIDQ1339743zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bhaskar Dutta, Arunava Sen

Publication date 8 December 1994

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1058

zbMATH Keywords

social choice functionBayesian-Nash equilibriuminfinite number of messages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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(5)

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• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
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