Informational geometry of social choice

DOI10.1007/s003550050061zbMath0886.90022OpenAlexW4232648056MaRDI QIDQ1367918

Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 13 April 1998

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050061

zbMATH Keywords

elementary geometrypositional voting methodsdictatorial behaviortopological result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences ⋮ From decision problems to dethroned dictators ⋮ Abstract aggregations and proximity preservation: an impossibility result ⋮ Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes ⋮ Topological social choice ⋮ Harmless Homotopic Dictators ⋮ Limiting dictatorial rules ⋮ A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.

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