Staggered contracts and profitable entry deterrence: An application to professional sports

DOI10.1007/BF01231468MaRDI QIDQ1375569zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mark R. Frascatore

Publication date 6 July 1998

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01231468

zbMATH Keywords

entry-deterrence strategiesprofessional-sports market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99)

Recommendations

• Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
• Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
• The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies
• Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
• Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence

Cites work

• Optimal Length of Labor Contracts

Cited in

(1)

• The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup

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