Investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

DOI10.1007/BF01226827MaRDI QIDQ1378873zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-François Fagnart, Marc Germain

Publication date 9 February 1998

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01226827

zbMATH Keywords

investmentlocal wage bargainingputty-clay model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Bargaining and the Timing of Investment
• Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model
• Strategic investment in a labour-managed duopoly
• Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment
• Factor price uncertainty, technology choice and investment delay

Cites work

• Underemployment, Irreversibilities and Growth under Trade Unionism

This page was built for publication: Investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1378873)