Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game

DOI10.1007/S001990050178MaRDI QIDQ1381083zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wilko Bolt, Harold Houba

Publication date 15 March 1998

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050178

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriavariable threat game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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