A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2337zbMath0914.90010MaRDI QIDQ1381966

Shigehiro Serizawa, Stephen Ching

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2337

zbMATH Keywords

uniform rule; maximal domain; single-plateaued domain; strategy-proof rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation, Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem, Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences, Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good, Indifference and the uniform rule, Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies

Cites Work

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• Voting by Committees
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule