Reinterpreting the kernel
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Publication:1381978
DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2314zbMATH Open0892.90190OpenAlexW1983030990MaRDI QIDQ1381978FDOQ1381978
Publication date: 1 April 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d48579a5d0490d23a8658d1f15dd5278b842fcb1
Recommendations
Cites Work
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- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
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Cited In (17)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
- Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective
- A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
- Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
- Bargaining with asymmetric threat points
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
- Signaling, screening, and core stability
- Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
- A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel
- The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games
- Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
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