Tie-breaking in games of perfect information

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0564MaRDI QIDQ1381997zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Torben Tranæs

Publication date 1 April 1998

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0564

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamestrategic implicationssubgame-perfect Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18246 (Why is no real title available?)
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Individual and Collective Time-Consistency
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.

Cited in

(5)

• Majority rip-off in referendum voting
• On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining.
• A new perfect information game; No chance backgammon
• Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency
• Sequential solutions in machine scheduling games

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