Hotelling and the New York stock exchange

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00100-6zbMATH Open0896.90018OpenAlexW2056385874MaRDI QIDQ1389563FDOQ1389563

Authors: Andrew J. Yates 

Publication date: 30 June 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00100-6

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zbMATH Keywords

Stackelbergstock exchangelocational competitionone-sided

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game theory
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.

Cited In (6)

• Bilevel competitive facility location and pricing problems
• On competition for listings
• Sequential Location Game on Continuous Directional Star Networks
• Sequential competitive location on networks
• Pattern classification of signals using Fisher kernels
• Firm response to ethically motivated boycotts

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