Are malpractice insurance premiums a tort signal that influence physician hours worked?

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00103-1MaRDI QIDQ1390997zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James Thornton

Publication date 22 July 1998

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00103-1

zbMATH Keywords

Defensive medicineIncome effectsPhysician labor supplyTort signal effects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

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Cites work

• Theoretical and experimental stidy of the elastoplastic state of cylindrical shells with rigid inclusion

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