Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous.

DOI10.1016/S0095-0696(03)00002-0MaRDI QIDQ1398338zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Carolyn Fischer, Ian W. H. Parry, William A. Pizer

Publication date 29 July 2003

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0095-0696(03)00002-0

zbMATH Keywords

Environmental policiesExternalitiesimpactsTechnological innovationWelfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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