Semivalues as power indices.
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Publication:1399609
DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00453-8zbMath1045.91003MaRDI QIDQ1399609
Francesc Carreras, Josep Freixas, María Jesús de la Puente
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A12: Cooperative games
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