Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits.

DOI10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00028-1MaRDI QIDQ1404946zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leslie Shiell

Publication date 25 August 2003

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00028-1

zbMATH Keywords

Equity and efficiencyInternational pollution policyTradable permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cited in

(14)

• The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections
• Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint
• Equity in international greenhouse gases abatement scenarios: a multicriteria approach.
• Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits
• An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
• Transaction costs and tradeable permits
• On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: type of externality and timing of policymaking
• Energy balance climate models and general equilibrium optimal mitigation policies
• Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
• The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy
• On international equity weights and national decision making on climate change
• The optimal size of a permit market
• Double-dipping in environmental markets
• A theoretical inefficiency in the international marketing of tradable global warming emission permits

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