Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game

DOI10.1007/S00199-002-0295-6MaRDI QIDQ1408946zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, Klaus G. Zauner

Publication date 28 September 2003

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0295-6

zbMATH Keywords

Learning modelsNon-cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cited in

(6)

• Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
• The existence of equilibrium in games with randomly perturbed payoffs and applications to experimental economics
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Nonparametric utility theory in strategic settings: revealing preferences and beliefs from proposal-response games
• Learning non-rational expectations equilibria
• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games

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