An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1414405
DOI10.1007/s001820100079zbMath1082.91024MaRDI QIDQ1414405
Publication date: 23 November 2003
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/an-axiomatization-of-the-shapley-value-using-a-fairness-property(0090365c-9bab-4367-b660-5bd0994788b6).html
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations, Characterizations of weighted and equal division values, A new basis and the Shapley value, The Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approach, Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games, Modularity and monotonicity of games, Coalitional games: monotonicity and core, Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value, Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems, Values with exogenous payments, Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games, Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value, Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value, Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value, On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games, Axioms of invariance for TU-games, Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values, Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games, Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value, A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance, Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities, On a class of solidarity values, Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications, Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values, The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity, ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE
