Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
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Publication:1414411
DOI10.1007/s001820100087zbMath1083.91008MaRDI QIDQ1414411
Aner Sela, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach
Publication date: 23 November 2003
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100087
differential information; winner's curse; dominant strategies; common-value second-price auctions; information superiority
91A10: Noncooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps, Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information, Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values, Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information, Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions, The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly., Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information, Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly, Information in Tullock contests