Noncooperative selection of the core
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Publication:1417445
DOI10.1007/s001820300137zbMath1066.91011MaRDI QIDQ1417445
Publication date: 5 January 2004
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300137
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A12: Cooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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