Noncooperative selection of the core

DOI10.1007/S001820300137MaRDI QIDQ1417445zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Huibin Yan

Publication date 5 January 2004

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300137

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powerrandom proposers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(24)

• A simple noncooperative core story
• Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies
• Bargaining with commitments
• A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core
• Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
• The burning coalition bargaining model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• An experiment on a core controversy
• Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
• Reflections on power, voting, and voting power
• The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification
• Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
• Maximizing selections from the core of a cooperative game
• Core-Equivalence for the Nash Bargaining Solution
• Coalition formation in games with externalities
• The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
• Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
• A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
• Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
• Dynamic multilateral markets
• A repeated coalitional bargaining model
• Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
• A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining

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