From evolutionary to strategic stability.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00078-4zbMATH Open1102.91308MaRDI QIDQ1420876FDOQ1420876

Klaus Ritzberger, Stefano De Michelis

Publication date: 23 January 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic stabilityEvolutionary game theoryIndex theoryStrategic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cited In (20)

• Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
• Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games
• On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
• Evolutionary Game Theory
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
• Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
• Riemannian game dynamics
• Epistemically robust strategy subsets
• Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
• Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart -- a study of minimal diversity games
• Universality of Nash components
• Dynamics of the Nash map in the game of Matching Pennies
• Nash blocks
• On sustainable equilibria
• Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics
• The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
• Perturbations of set-valued dynamical systems, with applications to game theory
• On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

This page was built for publication: From evolutionary to strategic stability.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1420876)