Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00089-9MaRDI QIDQ1421888zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Simon P. Anderson, Régis Renault

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00089-9

zbMATH Keywords

Deadweight lossMarketperformance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition

Cited in

(20)

• A lower-bound on monopoly profit for log-concave demand
• Cournot equilibrium revisited
• Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly
• Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
• The supermodularity of the tax competition game
• Cournot games with biconcave demand
• Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Efficiency loss in a Cournot oligopoly with convex market demand
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841918 (Why is no real title available?)
• EXCESS CAPACITY IN POST ENTRY COURNOT COMPETITION
• Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
• Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
• Characterizing agent behavior in revision games with uncertain deadline
• On the curvature of homogeneous functions
• Conflict between consumer and worker surpluses under monopoly power
• Market-dependent preferences, positive and negative network effects and welfare
• Robust lower bounds on monopoly profit with -concave demand
• Price dispersion in pure strategies
• Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests

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