Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
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Publication:1421921
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00067-2zbMath1064.91011MaRDI QIDQ1421921
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00067-2
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