Continuous auctions and insider trading: uniqueness and risk aversion

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Publication:1424703

DOI 10.1007/s007800200078</link>zbMath 1066.91057</link>OpenAlex W1988832155</link>MaRDI QID Q1424703</link>

Kyung-Ha Cho

Publication date: 16 March 2004

Published in: Finance and Stochastics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s007800200078




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