Delegation in oligopoly: managerial schemes and loan commitments

DOI10.1007/S00712-002-0570-9zbMATH Open1099.91519OpenAlexW2074535002MaRDI QIDQ1432002FDOQ1432002

Luis M. Granero, M. Paz Coscollá

Publication date: 11 June 2004

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-002-0570-9

zbMATH Keywords

managerial incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cited In (1)

• Strategic delegation in successive oligopolies with differentiated firms

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