Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance

DOI10.1006/GAME.2000.0798MaRDI QIDQ1577965zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leslie M. Marx, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date 4 March 2001

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0798

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Review text

Corrigendum to the authors' paper in ibid. 18, 219-245 (1997; Zbl 0871.90142). Propositions 1 and 2 are corrected.

Cites work

• Order independence for iterated weak dominance

Cited in

(9)

• Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• The trembling chairman paradox
• On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
• The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies
• AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
• On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response

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