Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance
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Publication:1577965
DOI10.1006/game.2000.0798zbMath0955.91001MaRDI QIDQ1577965
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Leslie M. Marx
Publication date: 4 March 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0798
91A10: Noncooperative games
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