What is structural empiricism? Scientific change in an empiricist setting

DOI10.1023/A:1005434915055MaRDI QIDQ1583737zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Otávio Bueno

Publication date 15 October 2001

Published in Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005434915055

zbMATH Keywords

constructive empiricismempirical adequacyinformativenesspartial structuresphilosophy of sciencepredictionquasi-truthrealismscientific changestructural empiricism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Foundations of classical theories (including reverse mathematics) (03B30)

Review text

This paper contributes to the realism-empiricism debate in the philosophy of science. It especially provides an empiricist answer to H. Putnam's `no miracles' argument, i.e., Putnam's claim that ``the positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [\textit{H. Putnam}, Mathematics, matter and method. Philosophical papers, vol. I, 2nd ed., Cambridge UP, Cambridge (1979; Zbl 0426.00022), p. 60]. The author's proposal is based on B. van Fraassen's constructive empiricist research programme, enriched with N. C. A. da Costa's and S. French's concepts of partial structures and quasi-truth. The author writes about his strategy to master the no-miracles argument: ``The first step consists in formulating a convenient notion of empirical adequacy, that allows, in particular, the introduction of degrees of empirical adequacy. Based on this, I shall then propose a model of scientific change, compatible with the main theses of constructive empiricism, and with this model at least part of the realist challenge can be met (pp. 64-65). He calls his approach `structural empiricism', ``being, on the one hand, disentangled from certain metaphysical assumptions typically found in realism [\dots], and sticking, on the other hand, to the employment of particular structures (in perfect agreement to the constructive empiricist stance) (p. 79).

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Cited in

(9)

• Newman's objection and the no miracles argument
• On the continuity of geometrized Newtonian gravitation and general relativity
• Generalizing empirical adequacy. II: Partial structures
• Quasi-Truth, Supervaluations and Free Logic
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1886431 (Why is no real title available?)
• Structural realism or modal empiricism?
• Is structure not enough?
• Quasi-truth, paraconsistency, and the foundations of science
• Structural realism, scientific change, and partial structures

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