Voting power in an ideological spectrum. The Markov-Pólya index
The author considers a weighted majority game with \(n\) players. He supposes that only certain coalitions in such a game can be formed, due to ideological constraints. In particular, it is supposed that the players are arrayed on a line, and only convex sets of players can be formed. The paper develops an extended Shapley-Shubik index for such a game, which it calls the Markov-Polya index, since the probabilities of pivoting turn out to be given by the Markov-Polya distribution. This result nicely extends that of \textit{P. H. Edelman} [ibid. 34, 37-50 (1997; Zbl 0917.90078)].
- On the Coleman indices of voting power
- Approximations to the Banzhaf Index of Voting Power
- A power index in weighted voting systems
- Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897
- A mathematical view on voting and power
- Power indices for multicandidate voting games
- The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures
- Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
- The mathematics and statistics of voting power
This page was built for publication: Voting power in an ideological spectrum. The Markov-Pólya index
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1590147)
