Initial and continuing compliance and the trade-off between monitoring and control cost

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1999.1116zbMATH Open0966.91046OpenAlexW2062717098MaRDI QIDQ1590749FDOQ1590749

Authors: Jon D. Harford 

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/13959e89c29d541205918aa66c7f9ead28e13f69

Recommendations

• The dynamics of optimal environmental regulation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3943518
• Guilty until proven innocent -- regulation with costly and limited enforcement
• The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly
• Instrument choice when regulators and firms bargain

zbMATH Keywords

abatement capitalfirst-best allocationisoabatement curves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cited In (1)

• Bargaining in environmental regulation revisited

This page was built for publication: Initial and continuing compliance and the trade-off between monitoring and control cost

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1590749)