Initial and continuing compliance and the trade-off between monitoring and control cost

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1999.1116MaRDI QIDQ1590749zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jon D. Harford

Publication date 20 August 2001

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/13959e89c29d541205918aa66c7f9ead28e13f69

zbMATH Keywords

abatement capitalfirst-best allocationisoabatement curves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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(1)

• Bargaining in environmental regulation revisited

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