Asymmetric price-benefits auctions

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0772MaRDI QIDQ1593746zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maria Angeles de Frutos

Publication date 25 January 2001

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4413

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• Ranking asymmetric auctions

Cites work

• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
• Comparative statics in first price auctions
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 605729 (Why is no real title available?)
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

Cited in

(14)

• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
• An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study
• Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
• The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
• Auctions with financial externalities
• Dissolving a partnership dynamically
• Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
• Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
• Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions

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