The purpose of this note is to apply results from the theory of Markov chains with rare transitions to stochastic games. The results obtained here are extensively used by the author [Two-player stochastic games I, II, ibid. 119, 55-91 (2000; Zbl 0974.91005) and ibid. 119, 93-126 (2000; Zbl 0978.91007)] to prove that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets has an equilibrium payoff.
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