Attainable results in committee elections.

DOI10.1016/S0895-7177(99)00117-XMaRDI QIDQ1596956zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors H.-H. Bock, W. H. E. Day, Ewa Kubicka, Grzegorz Kubicki, F. R. McMorris

Publication date 5 May 2002

Published in Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0895-7177(99)00117-x

zbMATH Keywords

Attainable resultCharacterizationCommittee electionConsensus ruleVoting scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Consensus rules for committee elections
• A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections
• Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
• Properties of multiwinner voting rules
• On the complexity of achieving proportional representation

Cites work

• Consensus rules for committee elections
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3575263 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3586931 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
• The human brain, social conformity, and presidential elections
• The nature and measurement of freedom

Cited in

(4)

• Votes and a half-binomial
• Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
• Method of generating functions for procedure of committee electing
• A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections

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