Efficient bargaining with underutilization of labor

DOI10.1007/BF01232417zbMATH Open0992.91057OpenAlexW2156543501MaRDI QIDQ1601964FDOQ1601964

Authors: Pierre Dehez, David de la Croix, Eric Toulemonde 

Publication date: 1 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01232417

Recommendations

• Monopoly unions versus efficient bargaining with free entry
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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingunionemploymentefficient contractmonopolist firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
• Employment Determination in British Industry: Investigations Using Micro- Data

Cited In (4)

• Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly
• Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations
• Efficient union labour contracts under seniority employment rules
• Monopoly unions versus efficient bargaining with free entry

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