Industrial concentration reverses the timing in a trade policy game

DOI10.1023/A:1012215913394MaRDI QIDQ1604698zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Masayuki Hayashibara

Publication date 8 July 2002

Published in Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1012215913394

zbMATH Keywords

policy timingstrategic trace policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cited in

(2)

• A note on the endogenous timing of tariff policy in the presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions
• Endogenous leadership with and without policy intervention: international trade when producer and seller differ

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